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Abstract 
 
Much of human knowledge is produced in the world’s universities.  There is currently little 
scientific evidence, however, on the determinants of productivity in those hundreds of thousands 
of departments.  This study constructs a new dataset on departmental chairpersons in 58 US 
research universities over a 15-year period.  One statistically robust predictor of a department’s 
future research output is found.  After adjustment for personal and institutional characteristics, 
departmental productivity improves when the incoming department Chair is himself or herself 
highly-cited.  A one-SD increase in citations is associated with a 0.5-SD later rise in 
departmental productivity.  Possible interpretations are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is an attempt to contribute to the research literatures on university 
productivity, the bibliometric role of citations data, and the nature of department leadership.  The 
starting point is a belief that the process of the advancement of scientific knowledge is important 
but still imperfectly understood.  Although research is pursued in approximately 300,000 
academic departments, housed in more than 20,000 universities worldwide1, relatively little is 
currently known about the factors that help to shape the productivity of departments2.   
This paper studies a panel of U.S. economics departments.  The paper’s analysis appears 
to be the first to examine the association between the characteristics of an incoming chairperson 
and the subsequent research productivity of his or her university department.  The level of an 
individual chairperson’s citations is found to be a form of predictor of later departmental 
productivity.  In contrast, the quantity of the person’s publications in itself is not longitudinally 
predictive of later organizational success. 3  Although a longstanding literature examines the 
potentially substantive influence of citations data as informative signals (for example, 
Hamermesh et al. 1982, Laband 1986, and Laband & Sophocleus 1985, and more recently 
Ellison 2011), the current paper’s concern appears not to have been previously studied. 
As is well known, Chairs (or ‘Heads of Department’) in the United States play a central 
role in the academic departments that make up universities.  They manage daily operations, hire 
faculty and professional staff, and work closely with senior university administrators, most of 
whom were themselves once departmental heads.  However, because faculty often view the 
position as a poisoned chalice, these chairpersons can be reluctant leaders, who are selected 
                                                 
1
 Cybermetrics Lab, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), Spain. 
2
 Novel recent work by Adams & Clemmons (2011) explores a different mechanism than the one studied here. 
3
 We caution the reader from the outset that our study is not able to establish causality in the way a randomized 
controlled trial can (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart & Lalive, 2010).  It is instead in the spirit of the ‘prospective’ 
analysis common in medical science.  We return to this issue below. 
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through moral persuasion and a rotation system that sometimes depends as much on a scholar’s 
age as aptitude for the job (Clotfelter & Rothschild 1993, Ehrenber 1999; 2003).   
The aim of this study is to examine the statistical links, in the spirit of Granger causality, 
between the characteristics of incoming Chairs and the later scientific productivity of their 
departments.  First, data are collected on 169 chairpersons in 58 US university departments over 
15 years, for one of the largest university disciplines, and one that sits between the mathematical 
sciences and non-mathematical social sciences, namely, the field of Economics.  Second, over 
the course of several years, measures of subsequent departmental research success were carefully 
collected and checked using diverse websites and extensive hard-copy materials.  The dependent 
variable in the regression equations is the change in Economics departments’ research output, 
after the Chair has been appointed, which is constructed as a measure of the relative 
improvement in departmental productivity.  Several independent variables are controlled for, 
including institutional variables such as income and federal grants, and Chairs’ other 
characteristics, such as their gender, experience and publications.  The results suggest a concave 
relationship between a Chair’s citations and the subsequent department performance. 
In the next section of this paper we connect the study with the relevant literature and 
propose a testable hypothesis.  The data and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 3, and 
the econometric analyses and results follow in Section 4.  Finally, in Section 5 we revisit the 
literature and discuss possible explanations for our results. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
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There is a growing research literature on the nature of scientific production and the 
importance of effective leadership in its success4.  Recent work suggests that the management of 
research enterprise has become more complex as modern scientific study is increasingly 
produced by teams, that have grown in size, are more likely to involve multi-university 
collaborations, that are ever more geographically dispersed (Adams, Black, Clemmons & 
Stephan 2005, Wuchty, Jones & Uzzi 2007, Jones, Wuchty & Uzzi 2008).   It is not surprising 
then that management practices, such as rewards and incentives, and research evaluation 
processes, are found to be associated with the performance of research teams (see Van der 
Weijden, de Gilder, Groenewegen & Klasen 2008).   Academic departments frequently house 
many (ever-evolving) research teams and the head of these units must manage a larger, more 
heterogeneous group of faculty who have a broader mission than pure research.   
The role of academic departments, and the Chairs who manage them, is particularly 
critical in research universities that tend to be decentralised with devolved powers going to 
departments.   Their important function is highlighted in a new study that assesses the effect of 
management practices on the performance of universities (McCormack, Propper & Smith 2013).   
McCormack, Propper & Smith (2013) examine management procedures in 112 UK universities 
using the measure of management quality tool developed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).  
McCormack and colleagues (2013) interview 248 department Chairs in the disciplines of 
Business, Computer Science, Psychology, and English.  They find that the quality of 
management practices can be directly linked to better performance in both research and teaching.  
The result holds for all types of universities – research or teaching focused, new or old.  Of 
particular relevance to our study is their finding that it is management practised at the level of 
                                                 
4
 Early studies that modern work builds on includes: Pelz, 1956, Andrews & Farris 1967, Blume & Sinclair 1973, 
among others.  
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academic departments, not by the centralised human resources, which matters most to research 
and teaching performance.   
Beerkens (2013) reports a similar finding in Australian universities that have been subject 
to increased competition by government since the mid-1990s.  She uses a research management 
index that aggregates a number of management practices at the institutional, school and 
individual level.  She finds that universities with intensive research management systems are 
associated with greater research productivity.   
A small number of studies have looked at the influence of distinguished scholars on the 
productivity of their peers and co-authors.  Azoulay, Zivin, & Wang (2010) found that the 
sudden death of a ‘superstar’ researcher led to the decline in collaborators’ quality-adjusted 
publication rates.  Oettl (2012a,b) builds on this work by looking at the social factors that may 
explain how star scientists affect others.  In academic papers produced by highly productive 
researchers, Oettl assesses the number of acknowledgments to others as a measure of 
‘helpfulness’.   He then examines the future productivity of collaborators following the death of 
distinguished co-authors.  When scientists who acknowledge many people in their academic 
papers die – the ‘highly helpful’ – the quality of co-author’s papers declines; however, among 
the collaborators working with top scientists who acknowledge few, productivity is unchanged 
by their death (Oettl 2012a,b).   
Our study focuses on leadership.  It builds on earlier longitudinal research using a panel 
of universities (Goodall, 2006; 2009a,b) that identified a relationship between the research 
productivity of a university president (over a lifetime) and the research performance of their 
institution (in later decades).  The presidents’ study -- one that argued for the idea of ‘expert 
leaders’ -- found that presidents with higher levels of life-time citations were associated with 
universities that went on to perform the best a number of years later.   
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Chairs generally serve at the discretion of a senior manager (e.g. dean, provost, president) 
and prior work suggests that there is a systematic pattern to who holds the position.  For 
example, department chairs are disproportionately likely to be white and male, although women 
and minorities have recently been increasing in number (Carroll & Wolverton 2004, Conrad, 
Carr, Knight, Renfrew, Dunn & Pololi 2010).   It is not unusual for senior administrators to 
select Chairs who have either undergone a decline in research productivity or made fewer 
research-specific investments over their careers (McDowell, Singell & Stater 2009, McDowell, 
Singell & Stater 2011), although it is less common in Tier 1 research universities that assign 
greater weight to the research productivity of potential departmental Chairs (Moore, Newman & 
Turnbull 2003; Ness & Samet 2010, Ehrenberg 1999).   
Our central research focus can be expressed in the following hypothesis.   
 
Hypothesis:  Academic departments led by Chairs who have accomplished research 
careers are associated with improved research performance.  
 
 
3.  DATA AND BASIC STATISTICS 
Data are collected on 169 chairpersons in 58 US economics departments over a fifteen-
year period, between 1995 and 20105.  All sampled chairs are observed in each year following 
his/her appointment and through the year following the end of the chair term.  For instance, a 
chair whose term encompasses the period beginning Fall 2001 through the end of Spring 2004 
(i.e., a three-year appointment) would be observed in our data in the years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 
2005.  On average, each sampled chair is observed in 4.27 temporal periods. The independent 
                                                 
5
  In the 58 departments, there were a total of 295 individuals who served as either a permanent or interim chair 
between 1995 and 2010.  Our sample excludes all interim chairs, all chairs who were appointed before 1995 or after 
2007, and all permanent chairs whose observed chair term (for whatever reason) was less than two years. 
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variables in the regression equations include career and demographic information about each 
Chair, and our dependent variable includes measures of subsequent departmental research 
success.  Variable definitions described below and presented in Table 1. 
 
(INSERT Table 1 HERE) 
 
3.1 Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable in the model is the change in Economics departments’ research 
output after the Chair has been appointed, which is a measure of the relative improvement in 
departmental productivity (see Table 1: Variable Definitions).  Specifically, departmental 
research success is calculated as the share of total weighted US Economics Department 
publications (i.e. 1/n and quality index) measured between the first year (t=0) of the Chair’s 
appointment and the subsequent observed year t, where research output in any specific year t is 
measured by a 3-yr moving average in years t-1, t, and t+1.  As an illustration, the dependent 
variables associated with a chair whose appointment begins in 2001 and ends in 2004 would be 
as follows: in the 2002 observation, the dependent variable is measured as the department's share 
of total Economics Department publications in 2002 minus the share in 2001;  in the 2003 
observation, the dependent variable is measured as the department's share of total Economics 
Department publications in 2003 minus the share in 2001; in the 2004 observation, the dependent 
variable is measured as the department's share of total Economics Department publications in 
2004 minus the share in 2001; and in the 2005 observation, the dependent variable is measured 
as the department's share of total Economics Department publications in 2005 minus the share in 
2001. The dependent variable uses publications data (collected annually over the years 1995 
through 2010) from 11 of the “most-selective” journals. These include: American Economic 
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Review, Econometrica, Economic Journal, Economica6, International Economic Review, Journal 
of Economic Theory, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Review of Economic 
Studies.  Only data relating to full articles are collected, thus excluding comments, replies and 
other such shorter forms of communications.   
Table 2 presents a ranking of Economics departments over the 15 years (1995-2010)  
using our dependent variable -- the mean annual research output of total weighted publications 
authored by individuals with an affiliation in a US Economics department (for the need to be 
cautious about such rankings, see Laband 2013).  Six institutions included in Table 2 are not 
used in the empirical analysis because: a) no Chair was appointed after 1994 for which at least 3 
consecutive years can be observed (Arizona State University and Ohio State); b) issues related to 
the availability of our university revenue variable, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
(Dartmouth and Rutgers); and c) there were no clearly delineated Economics departments 
(Caltech and Cornell).   
 
(INSERT Table 2 HERE) 
 
3.2 Independent Variables 
Our independent variables include information about the Chairs and their institutions (see 
Table 1).  We include three measures for the Chair’s research output, which is our key 
explanatory variable: Chair’s citations represent the cumulative number of citations made to the 
Chair’s five most highly cited articles published prior to his/her Chair appointment (measured as 
a citations total in the year 2012).   
                                                 
6
 The inclusion of Economica may look surprising, but this is for the historical reason that it was an important 
journal in the early years in our data collection period.  
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We also control for the number of years since each of the Chair’s five most-cited papers 
were published (the total number of years are averaged).  Finally, we include Chair’s cumulative 
number of total weighted journal publications measured to year t. The weighted measures 
convert page counts to American Economic Association-equivalent pages, use the 1/n rule for 
co-authored articles, and apply a quality indexing using the journal “Impact Factors” provided in 
the various annual editions of the Social Sciences Journal Citation Reports. 
Further information about Chairs’ characteristics are included in the regressions: gender, 
whether they were foreign-born, their total experience measured as years since PhD, the years 
spent at each university, the number of institutions in which he or she had worked, and finally,  
we include a set of dichotomous variables indicating the Chair’s research field (i.e. 
microeconomics, macroeconomics, history/thought, monetary, quantitative, public finance, 
international, agriculture/environmental, industrial organization, labor, other). 
Controls for the nature of each institution are also incorporated (see Table 1).  These 
measure the department’s research output at the start of the Chair’s term, the size of each 
department (we include a proxy for the number of economics PhDs7), and the wealth of each 
university.   To capture trends in the US academic markets for economists, we include variables 
that measure the Chair’s institution’s share of economics publications that do not go to 
Economics departments (i.e. business schools), and the share of top publications assigned to 
authors not affiliated with a US Economics department.  Finally, we include a set of 
dichotomous variables indicating the calendar year (i.e. 1995, 1996, 1997 … 2010). 
 
 (INSERT Table 3 HERE) 
 
                                                 
7
 It might be thought that we should control for the change in the size of department, but we wish to treat that as 
endogenous to the success of the Chairperson.  
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4. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3. Table 4 reports the study’s key findings.  Each 
rightward column introduces additional controls to a base specification in Column 1 that includes 
a quadratic in citations as well as the department’s research output at the start of the Chair’s 
term.  For reasons of brevity, the results are condensed into a single table (a number of 
alternative variants have been tested and are available upon request).   Clustered standard errors 
are used for the reported t-statistics in parentheses. 
In Model 1 of Table 4, a variable for Chair’s citations is statistically significant at the 5% 
level; the coefficient is 0.0001 and the t-statistic is 2.12.  The coefficient on the quadratic term 
(of -0.0624) is negative and significant at the 5% level.  It follows that the relationship between a 
department’s research output and a Chair’s research citations is estimated to be concave from 
below.   
(INSERT Table 4 HERE) 
 
The curvature can be seen in Figure 1.  Departmental performance, shown on the x-axis, 
maximizes when a Chair has approximately 9,100 citations.  With a mean citation number of 
2,153 and a standard deviation of  2,873, it is unclear how seriously this exact turning point itself 
should be treated as there are only 10 departmental heads who have citations in excess of 9,100 
(Ioannidis, 2010).  Nonetheless, the finding of some form of diminishing returns to a Chair’s 
citations appears to be a robust statistical conclusion.8  Model 1 also suggests mild evidence that 
a department’s research productivity may exhibit reversion to the mean.  The coefficient on a 
department’s research output at the start of a Chair’s term is -0.0861 with a t-statistic of -1.86.    
 
                                                 
8
 We have experimented with other nonlinear functional forms.  
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(INSERT Figure 1 HERE) 
 
 A natural hypothesis is that what matters is a department head’s own publishing 
productivity.  Thus, Model 2 introduces controls for the total number of weighted publications 
and the timing of citations.  Importantly, the magnitude, sign, and significance of both the level 
and quadratic terms on Chair’s citations are not affected by the introduction of these controls.  
Moreover, the coefficient on the level and quadratic terms for the total number of weighted 
publications are insignificant.   This finding implies that it is not the quantity of papers published 
by a Chair that matters but instead the extent to which the Chair’s work has been recognized 
through cited references to his or her research9.  In addition, the coefficient on the average 
number of years since each of the Chair’s most-cited papers were published is insignificant and 
has no effect on the link between the person’s citations and the department’s research 
productivity.     
Model 3 introduces demographic attributes and other aspects of a Chair’s career into the 
empirical specification.  Again, the broad conclusions with regard to the positive and 
diminishing effect of a Chair’s citations on department research output remain, and there is some 
evidence that the effect actually increases in magnitude and statistical significance.  The 
coefficient is 0.0002, and the t-statistic is 2.89, significant at the 1% level.  In addition, now the 
coefficient on the number of years since the Chair’s most cited work is negative and significant 
at the 10% level, suggesting that Chairs whose reputation is built on more recent work are 
relatively more effective at improving a department’s productivity.   
The coefficients on most of the newly introduced controls in Model 3 are insignificant at 
traditional levels (i.e., the controls for gender, foreign-born, Chair’s years at current university, 
                                                 
9
 As an extra check we include a control for the Chair's own publications during his/her term as department head.  
We found no significance attached to the chair's "own contribution" control.   
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and number of institutions where Chair has worked).  However, there appears to be a non-linear, 
statistically significant effect associated with experience, suggesting a Chair’s years since PhD 
has a positive net effect after approximately 20.5 years of experience.   In other words, all else 
equal, the tradition of putting more senior faculty in the position of Chair is consistent with a 
raising of a department’s research productivity, although the impact here is smaller relative to the 
quality of the Chair as measured by citations.  
In Model 4 we include a number of variables to control for the size of the Economics 
department and for university characteristics (see Table 1: Variable Definitions).   In general, the 
conclusions drawn from the previous models are unaltered, although the mean-reversion effect 
related to departmental productivity increases both in magnitude and significance in the more 
fully specified model.  Many of the newly introduced institutional variables are significant at 
traditional levels.  Specifically, the share of publications to non-US Economics departments has 
a significantly negative effect; articles that are published to authors outside the US Economics 
departments reduce the available pool.  The institution’s share of Economics publications that go 
to faculty based in non-Economics departments (e.g., business and policy schools) in the Chair’s 
institution is significantly positive; this result suggests a possible complementarity between 
productive schools that hire economists and Economics departments.  The Total Economics 
PhDs granted at the Chair’s university’ measures the number of Economics PhDs conferred over 
the years 1995-2010, which is a proxy for the size of the department.  As expected, the 
coefficient is positive and significant, which suggests that larger departments have higher overall 
productivity. 
 The final two variables introduced in Model 4 control for university income.  They use 
data collected from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).  The 
penultimate row has the total current funds in year t.  This variable comprises revenues from 
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tuition and fees, government appropriations (federal, state and local), private gifts, grants and 
contracts, endowment income, sales and services of educational activities, "auxiliary 
enterprises", hospitals, "other sources", and "independent operations".  The introduction of 
university income into Model 4 does not alter the previous results.  The insignificance of the 
financial variable in Model 4 suggests that change in departmental quality -- research output -- is 
not closely tied to aggregate university income.   However, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the 
Chair’s university’s share of Federal grants in year t is negative and marginally significant.   
The four specifications in Table 4 demonstrate that the citations curve relationship is 
robust and economically significant.  First, evidence for a longitudinal link between a Chair’s 
citations and the later research output of the department is not strongly influenced by changes in 
the detailed econometric specification.  Second, the last row of Table 4 presents the number of 
citations at which the quadratic reaches its maximum in each model.  The point at which the 
curve turns is numerically approximately the same, at between 9100 and 9800 lifetime citations, 
across the four columns.  If taken literally, the implied effect of Chairs is large.  A one standard 
deviation rise in a chairperson’s citations (from a base of zero citations) is associated with a later 
improvement of approximately one half of a standard deviation in the department’s later research 
productivity.  Finally, one last possible criticism is that highly cited Chairs might be found more 
often in departments with faster growing shares of publications because of a potential 
willingness of highly cited Chairs to go into leadership positions where department productivity 
is growing (and not because the highly cited Chairs’ brought about the increased productivity).  
A test was done for this, and no evidence found for it. More exactly, an extra right-hand side 
variable, in Department Trend, was added to the main econometric specification.  This variable 
was constructed using the coefficients for a linear time trend in department share of publications 
for each of the economics departments in the sample.  The inclusion of this Department Trend 
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variable did not affect the existence of a quadratic curve in Chair citations.  Detailed 
specifications are available upon request.  
Because our study is in the spirit of Granger causality, we wish to emphasize extreme 
caution in causal interpretation.  Nevertheless, in this important area, in which real-life decisions 
have necessarily to be taken every day by Deans around the world, and about which so little 
formal evidence exists, the patterns found in this analysis may be of practical interest and may 
act to spur further research.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The underlying determinants of research productivity are not perfectly understood.  
Little, in particular, is currently known about the characteristics of successful leaders in the 
thousands of academic departments that make up the world’s universities.   In what appears to be 
the first study of its kind, this analysis is an attempt to compile a detailed new dataset on, and 
examine the statistical links between, the characteristics of incoming Chairs and the later 
scientific productivity of their departments.   
The paper’s results should be treated cautiously.  Tools used in natural experiments such 
as death of a leader (e.g. Jones & Olken 2005) are not possible in our setting because so few 
Chairs die in post.  We are therefore careful -- we wish to emphasize -- not to give a definitive 
causal interpretation to these patterns in the data.  Nevertheless, the econometric analysis finds 
that one of the very few longitudinal predictors of a department’s future research success is the 
cumulative number of citations to the incoming Chair’s own research (that is, the Chair’s 
research done prior to his or her appointment as head of department).  This result appears 
statistically to be a robust one, which suggests it may repay further scrutiny.  For example, it 
holds after controlling for a large variety of factors, including the prior success of the university 
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department, and institutional variables such as income and federal grants, and variables for 
Chairs’ other characteristics, such as their gender, work experience, and publications.  For 
brevity, we have concentrated our findings into a single table (Table 4).  However, a number of 
variants, with the same conclusion, have been tested and are available upon request.  
Statistically, it is the Chair’s total citations that seem to matter; there is no detectable statistical 
effect from a Chair’s publications.   
What might be the mechanism through which Chairs could influence the research output 
of academic departments? And how might this depend upon citations to their own research?  
Oettl shows that the death of star researchers who acknowledge many people on academic papers 
– a measure of helpfulness – has a later effect on the productivity of co-authors (2012a,b).  In 
contrast, scholars who acknowledge few, leave collaborators unaffected when they die.   
Interestingly, the study also reports that academic paper acknowledgments are correlated with 
authors’ citations.  This may be down to sycophancy, although one might expect this 
characteristic to be less common in research stars.  In a later study, Agrawal, McHale, and Oettl 
(2013) examine the effect of star researchers on the productivity of 255 evolutionary biology 
departments over a twenty year period.  The authors find that the arrival of star researchers 
attracts subsequent high-quality scientists, which has the most significant effect on future 
departmental productivity.  This finding was strongest in mid-ranking universities.  These studies 
may help us to understand our key finding – that highly cited department Chairs are associated 
with better future research performance.  A Chairs’ research citations may signify that they are 
high on helpfulness (Oettl, 2012a,b), and also, that they are able to recruit other good scholars to 
their departments (Agrawal, McHale & Oettl 2013).  Moreover, academics who have had 
successful research careers may behave differently when they become department Chairs.  
Interviews with university presidents (Goodall 2009a,b) revealed that scholar-leaders found it 
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easier to recruit and retain other top scholars.  It was argued there that this may be because of 
reputational factors (Hamermesh & Pfann 2012), or because a head who is a cited scholar signals 
to potential recruits that he or she understands how to create the right incentives and work 
environment for other research-focussed academics (Andrews & Farris1967; Goodall 2009a,b).    
McCormack, Propper & Smith (2013) identify the key areas associated with university 
performance as recruitment, retention, and promotion.  McCormack and colleagues, show, in UK 
universities, that departments which are better managed demonstrate better performance in both 
research and teaching.  Their finding holds across all types of universities, and because of the 
decentralised nature of academic institutions, they note that it is practices at the department level, 
not within centralised human resources, that seem to matter most.  Importantly, they conclude, as 
we do, that the results are not driven by differences in resources.  Azoulay, Zivin, & Manso 
(2011) compare outputs from researchers at the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI) with 
those funded through the National Institute of Health (NIH).  While they do not focus on 
leadership in these groups, they do call attention to management practices that are associated 
with high-impact papers.  Azoulay and colleagues find that HHMI tolerates early failure, is 
prepared to reward long-term success, and gives researchers a great deal of autonomy; by 
contrast, recipients of funding from the NIH are exposed to shorter review cycles, and expected 
to produce outputs that are predefined, and early failure is tolerated less.  The authors show that 
HHMI investigators produce more novel and more highly cited papers than the comparison 
group funded by NIH (Azoulay, Zivin & Manso 2011).  Given the department Chairs’ result, it 
would be interesting to know whether the decision-makers in the Howards Hughes Institute were 
themselves more cited researchers than their peers in the National Institute of Health.   
As suggested above, our result is consistent, at a different level of aggregation, with an 
earlier longitudinal analysis of university presidents (Goodall, 2009a,b).  The suggestion that 
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leaders and followers should share equivalent levels of technical expertise has also been 
examined previously in different settings – for example in basketball (Goodall, Kahn & Oswald,  
2011) – and in early cross-sectional studies (e.g. Andrews & Farris 1967, Barnowe 1975, 
McAuley, Duberley & Cohen 2000, Mumford, Marks, Connelly, Zaccaro & Reiter-Palmon 
2000).   Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, & Strange (2002) summarize these findings: they argue that 
technical and creative problem-solving skills are necessary when leading creative people, and 
that the evaluation of researchers and their ideas is best done by individuals who share their 
competencies.  Also, leaders who have the same creative and technical abilities as their followers 
can communicate clearly and articulate the goals of the organization (Mumford et al., 2002).   
The issue of why it is that cited work appears to be such an influential statistical signal 
cannot be definitively answered by our study.  It seems to deserve to be considered, perhaps with 
a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods, in future research.   
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FIGURE 1 
The Later Change in Research Output of US University Departments 
as a Function of the Incoming Department Chair’s Citations 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (i) Only 10 of 169 Chairpersons had lifetime citations above the turning point of 9100 citations. (ii) This 
curve is based on Column 1 in Table 4.  (iii) The level of research output is measured as a 3-yr moving average.   
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TABLE 1 
Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variable 
Change in department’s research output:  The change in a department’s share of total US 
weighted economics publications (i.e. 1/n and quality index) measured between the first year 
(t=0) of the Chair’s appointment and the current year t, where research output in year t is 
measured by a 3-yr moving average in years t-1, t, and t+1.   
Publications data is collected annually over the years 1995 through 2010 from the following 
select journals: American Economic Review, Econometrica, Economic Journal, Economica, 
International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, and the Review of Economic Studies.  Only data relating to full articles are collected, 
thus excluding comments, replies and other such shorter forms of communications. 
 
Independent Variables 
(1) Chair’s research output 
Chair’s citations: The cumulative number of citations made to the Chair’s five most highly cited 
articles that were published prior to his/her Chair appointment (measured in 2012).   
Number of years since Chair’s most cited work: The number of years since each of the 
Chair’s five most cited papers were published; the total number of years are averaged.  
Chair’s total weighted publications:  Chair’s cumulative number of total weighted (i.e. 1/n and 
quality index) journal publications measured to year t. 
The weighted measures convert page counts to AEA-equivalent pages, use the 1/n rule for 
coauthored articles, and apply a quality indexing using the journal “Impact Factors” provided in 
the various annual editions of the Social Sciences Journal Citation Reports. 
(2) Chair Characteristics 
Female Chair: Dichotomous variable = 1 if the Chair is female.  
Foreign-born Chair: Dichotomous variable = 1 if the Chair has a non-US birthplace.  
Chair’s years since PhD: The number of years since the Chair received his/her PhD. 
Chair’s years at university: The number of years that the Chair has worked at the university 
prior to his/her Chair appointment. 
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Number of institutions where Chair has worked: The number of institutions the Chair has had 
a permanent appointment measured from the PhD year to the year of the Chair’s appointment.   
(3) Institution Controls 
Department’s research output at the start of the Chair’s term: The department share of total 
weighted US economics publications in the first year of chair’s term (this is an average of 
weighted publications in the year immediately prior to the Chair appointment, in the year of the 
appointment, and the first year after).  
Share of world publications to non-US Economics departments: The share of all weighted 
publications in year t that are authored by individuals with a non-US economics department 
affiliation over the years 1995-2010.   
Institution’s share of economics publications to business and policy schools:  The Chair’s 
institution’s share of all weighted publications in year t that are authored by individuals in a US 
non-Economics department (e.g. business schools, policy schools, etc.) over the years 1995-
2010.   
Total economics PhDs granted at Chair’s university: The total number of economics PhDs 
granted by the Chair’s university over the years 1995-2010. 
University revenue: Total current fund revenues in year t (millions).  This variable includes: 
tuition and fees, government appropriations (federal, state and local), private gifts, grants and 
contracts, endowment income, sales and services of educational activities, "auxiliary 
enterprises", hospitals, "other sources", and "independent operations". Data collected from the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). 
University’s share of federal grants: The Chair’s university’s share (%) of the total (i.e., in 
sampled institutions) federal grants in year t. Data collected from the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS). 
(4) Field dummies 
Set of dichotomous variables indicating the Chair’s research field (i.e. microeconomics, 
macroeconomics, history/thought, monetary, quantitative, public finance, international, 
agriculture/environmental, industrial organization, labor, other). 
(5) Year dummies 
Set of dichotomous variables indicating the calendar year (i.e. 1995, 1996, 1997 … 2010). 
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TABLE 2 
Economics Department Rankings 
 
Economics Department Rankings based on the Mean Annual Research Output of Total Weighted 
Publications Authored by Individuals with an Affiliation in an Economics Department at a US  
University (publication counts measured over 1995-2010 in 11 select journals)1, 2 
             Annual Research Output      Aggregate Research Output 
      In All Years 1995 through 2010           Shares in the Years        
    Rank3 Mean St. d. Min  Max    1995-02    2003-10   Change  
Harvard     1  7.72 1.50 5.22 10.40      7.53            7.86   0.32 
M.I. T.       2  7.03 1.49 4.39  9.99      7.85            6.45  -1.40 
Princeton     3  5.33 2.06 2.07  8.12      5.76            4.76  -1.00 
Univ. of Calif., Berkeley   4  4.32 2.21 0.73  8.45      3.14            5.76   2.61 
Chicago     5  4.23 1.96 2.09  8.98      4.76            3.61  -1.14 
New York University    6  3.67 1.44 0.93  6.31      3.24            4.07   0.82 
Yale      7  3.44 1.44 1.50  6.60      3.22            3.63   0.40 
Stanford     8  3.38 1.56 1.26  7.58      2.60            4.39   1.78 
Northwestern     9  3.25 1.12 1.60  5.83      2.65            3.86   1.21 
Pennsylvania    10  3.16 1.27 0.97  5.33      3.08            3.02  -0.06 
Univ. of Calif., Los Angeles  11  2.91 1.09 1.14  4.13      2.33            3.66   1.32 
Columbia    12  2.67 1.56 1.02  5.49      1.99            3.64   1.64 
Michigan    13  2.17 0.86 0.76  3.85      2.41            1.82  -0.59 
Univ. of Calif., San Diego  14  2.15 1.32 0.91  6.01      2.26            1.90  -0.36 
Wisconsin    15  2.06 0.97 1.04  4.88      2.24            1.81  -0.43 
Brown     16  1.98 0.89 0.61  4.02      1.82            2.16   0.34 
Minnesota    17  1.74 1.04 0.59  5.03      1.65            1.82   0.17 
Boston University   18  1.71 0.80 0.68  3.01      2.14            1.17  -0.96 
Maryland    19  1.55 0.97 0.39  4.47      1.15            1.82   0.66 
Texas, Austin    20  1.24 0.88 0.18  3.65      1.80            0.69  -1.10 
Rochester    21  1.24 0.58 0.41  2.45      1.61            0.88  -0.73 
Cornell     22  1.17 0.50 0.15  1.89      1.24            1.04  -0.20 
Cal Tech     23  1.15 0.75 0.00  2.47      1.06            1.32   0.26 
Duke     24  1.11 0.60 0.36  2.27      0.74            1.54   0.79 
Ohio State    25  1.11 0.48 0.28  2.02      1.25            0.90  -0.34 
Dartmouth    26  0.99 0.69 0.00  2.35      0.70            1.31   0.61 
Johns Hopkins    27  0.96 0.55 0.21  2.04      1.15            0.70  -0.45 
Carnegie-Mellon   28  0.90 0.41 0.00  1.71      0.71            1.09   0.38 
Pittsburgh    29  0.90 0.68 0.09  2.23      1.10            0.61  -0.49 
Penn State    30  0.90 0.53 0.21  2.02      0.92            0.85  -0.07 
Illinois      31  0.86 0.61 0.06  2.36      0.96            0.84  -0.12 
Univ. of Calif., Davis   32  0.85 0.52 0.13  1.90      0.83            0.91   0.07 
Virginia    33  0.83 0.42 0.12  1.64      1.16            0.56  -0.59 
Boston College    34  0.78 0.41 0.25  1.66      0.72            0.87   0.15 
Georgetown     35  0.77 0.56 0.00  1.84      0.75            0.81   0.06 
USC     36  0.75 0.59 0.05  2.38      0.66            0.73   0.06  
Iowa     37  0.71 0.53 0.00  2.19      0.97            0.42  -0.54 
Michigan State    38  0.70 0.45 0.16  1.67      0.80            0.56  -0.23 
Univ. of Calif., Santa Barbara  39  0.67 0.53 0.04  1.68      0.71            0.65  -0.06 
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Arizona State University  40  0.63 0.52 0.00  1.51      0.66            0.74   0.08 
Washington, St. Louis   41  0.53 0.37 0.00  1.17      0.46            0.64   0.18 
Univ. of Calif., Santa Cruz  42  0.50 0.41 0.00  1.58      0.38            0.59   0.21 
Florida     43  0.45 0.44 0.00  1.75      0.65           0.22  -0.42 
Rutgers     44  0.43 0.39 0.00  1.43      0.69           0.24  -0.45 
Univ. of Calif., Irvine    45  0.42 0.39 0.00  1.52      0.30           0.53   0.23 
University of Arizona   46  0.41 0.22 0.00  0.90      0.44           0.39  -0.05 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill  47  0.40 0.43 0.00  1.58      0.48           0.29  -0.18 
Vanderbilt    48  0.40 0.20 0.00  0.79      0.44           0.36  -0.08 
Texas A&M    49  0.39 0.46 0.00  1.71      0.54            0.23  -0.31 
Houston    50  0.39 0.28 0.00  0.89      0.46            0.30  -0.16 
Rice     51  0.37 0.37 0.00  1.15      0.38            0.28  -0.10 
Washington    52  0.36 0.39 0.00  1.25      0.59            0.14  -0.45 
Purdue     53  0.35 0.32 0.00  1.29      0.43            0.30  -0.13 
Oregon     54  0.33 0.25 0.00  0.84      0.39            0.26  -0.12 
Iowa State    55  0.32 0.28 0.07  1.23      0.20            0.49   0.29 
Colorado    56  0.32 0.26 0.00  0.89      0.30            0.38   0.08 
Indiana     57  0.30 0.20 0.00  0.61      0.39            0.23  -0.16 
Emory      58  0.25 0.23 0.00  0.73      0.19            0.31   0.12 
SUNY, Albany     59  0.24 0.24 0.00  0.84      0.29            0.22  -0.06 
SMU     60  0.21 0.14 0.00  0.50      0.24            0.18  -0.06 
Delaware    61  0.20 0.41 0.00  1.66      0.24            0.11  -0.13 
VPI       62  0.16 0.20 0.00  0.58      0.26            0.05  -0.21 
Notre Dame    63  0.16 0.23 0.00  0.62      0.11           0.23   0.12 
George Mason    64  0.12 0.29 0.00  1.14      0.04           0.24   0.20 
 
1   Publication data is collected annually over the years 1995 through 2010 from the following 11 selected 
journals: American Economic Review, Econometrica, Economic Journal, Economica, International 
Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Political 
Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Review of 
Economic Studies.  Only data relating to full articles are collected, thus excluding comments, replies and 
other such shorter forms of communications.  
 
2   The weighted measures convert page counts to AEA-equivalent pages, use the 1/n rule for coauthored 
articles, and apply a quality indexing using the journal “Impact Factors” provided in the various annual 
editions of the Social Sciences Journal Citation Reports. 
 
3   To be included in these rankings, an institution’s Department of Economics must have had one of the 
top-60 research outputs during either the 1995-2002 period or the 2003-2010 period (or both).  
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TABLE 3  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable     
Change in department’s research output:   -9.88E-6 0.629 -2.817 3.369 
 
    
Independent Variables     
 
    
(1) Chair’s research output     
Chair’s citations (to 5 most cited articles) 2153.1 2873.3 10 17603 
Years since Chair’s most cited work 12.97 4.79 2 33 
Chair’s total weighted publications 22.87 17.70 2.16 111.52 
     
(2) Chair Characteristics     
Female Chair 0.067 0.250 0 1 
Foreign born Chair 0.290 0.454 0 1 
Chair’s years since PhD 24.33 6.55 10 48 
Chair’s years at university 14.55 8.61 0 42 
Number of institutions where Chair has 
worked 
2.10 1.09 1 6 
    
    
(3) Institution Controls     
Department’s research output at the start of 
the Chair’s term 1.531 1.763 0.000 8.562 
Share of world publications to non-US 
Economics departments (%) 
55.08 2.63 50.93 61.19 
Institution’s share of economics 
publications to business and policy schools 
(%) 
1.73 3.08 0 14.48 
Total economics PhDs granted at Chair’s 
university 208.5 124.4 42 555 
University revenue (100 millions) 18.311 13.654 1.002 101.599 
University’s share of federal grants (%) 1.64 1.13 0.06 5.72 
     
(4) Field Dummies      
Microeconomics 0.158 0.365 0 1 
Macroeconomics 0.108 0.310 0 1 
History/Thought 0.044 0.204 0 1 
Quantitative 0.102 0.303 0 1 
Public Finance 0.050 0.217 0 1 
Monetary 0.121 0.327 0 1 
International 0.093 0.291 0 1 
Agriculture/Environment 0.040 0.196 0 1 
Industrial Organization 0.080 0.271 0 1 
Labor 0.168 0.375 0 1 
Other 0.036 0.187 0 1 
(5) Time Dummies     
1996 0.019 0.138 0 1 
1997 0.035 0.184 0 1 
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1998 0.052 0.222 0 1 
1999 0.063 0.243 0 1 
2000 0.068 0.252 0 1 
2001 0.078 0.270 0 1 
2002 0.081 0.272 0 1 
2003 0.082 0.275 0 1 
2004 0.079 0.270 0 1 
2005 0.075 0.264 0 1 
2006 0.084 0.277 0 1 
2007 0.088 0.284 0 1 
2008 0.076 0.266 0 1 
2009 0.067 0.250 0 1 
2010 0.051 0.220 0 1 
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TABLE 4 
Regression Equations for the Later Improvement  
                                           in Department Research Performance  
 
(The dependent variable is the change in a department’s research output measured between the 
first year of the incoming Chair’s appointment and the current observed year.  Research output of 
a department is measured by a 3-yr moving average of quality-weighted publications) 
 
Explanatory variable 
 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 
 
Chair’s citations  0.0001** (2.12) 
 0.0001** 
(2.28) 
 0.0002*** 
(2.89) 
 0.0001*** 
(2.82)       
Chair’s citations squared  
(scaled by 10 million) 
-0.0624** 
(-1.96) 
-0.0671** 
(-2.11) 
-0.0851*** 
(-2.57) 
-0.0705*** 
(-2.86)    
Department’s research output at the  
start of the Chair’s term 
-0.0861* 
(-1.86) 
-0.0873* 
(-1.90) 
-0.0726* 
(-1.70)       
-0.2331*** 
(-5.61)       
Number of years since Chair’s  
most cited work   
-0.0080 
(-0.68) 
-0.0253* 
(-1.71)    
-0.0205* 
(-1.72)       
Chair’s total weighted publications  -0.0058 (-0.73) 
-0.0087 
(-1.12)   
-0.0083 
(-1.07)       
Chair’s total weighted  
publications squared   
0.0001 
(0.71) 
0.0001 
(0.71)     
0.0000 
(1.03)       
Female Chair   0.1348 (0.82)    
0.1337  
(0.86)     
Foreign-born Chair   0.0085 (0.10)       
0.0023 
(0.03)    
Chair’s years since PhD   -0.0655** (-1.94)    
-0.0436 
(-1.59)       
Chair’s years since PhD squared    0.0016*** (2.52)     
0.0011** 
(2.02)       
Chair’s years at current university   0.0048 (0.67)       
0.0037 
(0.55)       
Number of institutions where  
Chair has worked   
0.0667 
(1.07)        
0.0589 
(1.07)       
Share of world publications to non-
US Economics departments    
-0.1520** 
(-2.45)      
Institution’s share of publications to 
business and policy schools    
0.0533** 
(2.14)       
Total economics PhDs granted at the 
Chair’s university    
0.0014*** 
(2.64)       
University revenueª    0.0057 (1.51)       
University’s share of federal grants    -0.0636* (-1.68)       
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FIELD DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
          R² 0.075 0.081 0.126 0.224 
Citations number at which the 
quadratic reaches its maximum 9,094 9,389 9,194 9,773 
  
 
n=825;   *** - significant at 0.01 level; ** - significant at 0.05 level; * - significant at 0.10 level;   
Clustered t-statistics in parentheses. 
Field dummies are dummy variables for the Chair’s sub-specialty. 
ª If we instead use the ‘change in revenue’ in the model, the financial variable remains statistically insignificant. 
This variable includes revenues from tuition and fees, government appropriations (federal, state and local), private 
gifts, grants and contracts, endowment income, sales and services of educational activities, "auxiliary enterprises", 
hospitals, "other sources", and "independent operations".   
The mean of Chairs’ citations is 2153.1; the standard deviation is 2873.3; the minimum is 10; the maximum is 
17603. 
 
 
